

# A Conditional Logic for Deontic Dilemmas Allowing for Detachment


Christian Straßer

Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science  
Ghent University, Belgium  
`Christian.Strasser@UGent.be`


February 18, 2009

- 1 Introduction
  - Points of interest
  - Deontic conflicts
  - Dealing with deontic conflicts
  - Going conditional
  - Goble's CDPM logic
- 2 Detachment
  - What is detachment?
  - Problems with detachment
- 3 An adaptive logic for detachment
  - What are adaptive logics?
  - An adaptive logic for detachment
- 4 Outlook

# Points of Interest



# Points of Interest



# Deontic Conflicts

Example: The dilemma of Sartre's pupil

- Obligation **A**: stay with the ill mother
- Obligation **B**: join the forces to fight the Nazis

# Deontic Conflicts

Example: The dilemma of Sartre's pupil

- Obligation **A**: stay with the ill mother
- Obligation **B**: join the forces to fight the Nazis

Formal definition

- Two obligations:  $OA, OB$
- both are possible:  $\Diamond A, \Diamond B$
- they cannot jointly be realized:  $\neg\Diamond(A \wedge B)$


They are often characterized by

- obligations with equal force
- incommensurable obligations

# Deontic Explosion


$$\text{Conflict}(A, B) \vdash \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \bullet \text{ anything} \\ \bullet \text{ any obligation} \end{array} \right.$$

# Deontic Explosions







# Deontic Explosions



# Deontic Explosions




# Deontic Explosions



Approaches for logics dealing with deontic explosions:

- Restricting/Rejecting **ECQ** – going paraconsistent
- Restricting AND: Goble's logic  $\mathcal{P}$
- Restricting RM: Goble's logics DPM


# Deontic Explosions



Approaches for logics dealing with deontic explosions:

- Restricting/Rejecting ECQ – going paraconsistent
- Restricting **AND**: Goble's logic  $\mathcal{P}$
- Restricting RM: Goble's logics DPM

# Deontic Explosions



Approaches for logics dealing with deontic explosions:

- Restricting/Rejecting ECQ – going paraconsistent
- Restricting AND: Goble's logic  $\mathcal{P}$
- Restricting **RM**: Goble's logics DPM

# Dealing with Deontic Dilemmas - The Basic Idea underlying DPM

Replace the inheritance principle

RM if  $\vdash A \rightarrow B$  then  $\vdash OA \rightarrow OB$

by a restricted version:

RPM if  $\vdash A \rightarrow B$  then  $\vdash PA \rightarrow (OA \rightarrow OB)$

# Some reasons to go dyadic

# Some reasons to go dyadic

! many of our obligations and permissions are of conditional nature

? But why not modelling “Under condition  $A$  we’re committed to bring about  $B$ ” by e.g.

- $A \rightarrow OB$ , or
- $O(A \rightarrow B)$  ?



# Some reasons to go dyadic - Strengthening of the Antecedent

The problem of strengthening the antecedent

$$\frac{A \text{ commits to do } B}{\therefore A \text{ and } C \text{ commits to do } B}$$

- it is fully valid in the (standard) monadic modellings,

# Some reasons to go dyadic - Strengthening of the Antecedent

The problem of strengthening the antecedent

$$\frac{A \text{ commits to do } B}{\therefore A \text{ and } C \text{ commits to do } B}$$

- it is fully valid in the (standard) monadic modellings,
- but: do we want that in all cases?
  - We're in general obliged to not eat with fingers.
  - Being served asparagus we're obliged (or permitted) to eat with fingers.

# Some reasons to go dyadic - Strengthening of the Antecedent

The problem of strengthening the antecedent

$$\frac{A \text{ commits to do } B}{\therefore A \text{ and } C \text{ commits to do } B}$$

- it is fully valid in the (standard) monadic modellings,
- but: do we want that in all cases?
  - We're in general obliged to not eat with fingers.
  - Being served asparagus we're obliged (or permitted) to eat with fingers.
  - We do not want to derive, that we're obliged not to eat with fingers being served asparagus.

# Some reasons to go dyadic - Strengthening of the Antecedent

The problem of strengthening the antecedent

$$\frac{A \text{ commits to do } B}{\therefore A \text{ and } C \text{ commits to do } B}$$

- it is fully valid in the (standard) monadic modellings,
- but: do we want that in all cases?
  - We're in general obliged to not eat with fingers.
  - Being served asparagus we're obliged (or permitted) to eat with fingers.
  - We do not want to derive, that we're obliged not to eat with fingers being served asparagus.
- this can be handled easier in dyadic approach

## Some reasons to go dyadic - Prima facie obligations

Paradoxes such as the Gentle Murderer, or Chisholm's paradox are very hard to handle in monadic approaches.

### Gentle Murderer Paradox

- If you kill, you should kill gently.
- You should not kill.
- If you kill gently then you kill.
- You kill.

Dyadic approaches score here much better.

# Going conditional

$$O(A/B)$$

- “Under condition  $B$  it ought to be that  $A$ .”
- Define:  $P(A/B) =_{\text{df}} \neg O(\neg A/B)$ .

# Going conditional

$$O(A/B)$$

- “Under condition  $B$  it ought to be that  $A$ .”
- Define:  $P(A/B) =_{df} \neg O(\neg A/B)$ .

# Going conditional

$$O(A/B)$$

- “Under condition  $B$  it ought to be that  $A$ .”
- Define:  $P(A/B) =_{df} \neg O(\neg A/B)$ .

## Example

$$(1) O(\neg f/\top)$$

$$(2) P(f/a)$$

(1) In general we're supposed not to eat with fingers.

(2) Eating asparagus we're allowed to eat with fingers.



# The logic **CDPM.1c'**

## CDPM.1c'

If  $\vdash A \leftrightarrow B$  then  $\vdash O(C/A) \leftrightarrow O(C/B)$  (RCE)

If  $\vdash B \leftrightarrow C$  then  $\vdash O(B/A) \leftrightarrow O(C/A)$  (CRE)

# The logic CDPM.1c'

## CDPM.1c'

If  $\vdash A \leftrightarrow B$  then  $\vdash O(C/A) \leftrightarrow O(C/B)$  (RCE)

If  $\vdash B \leftrightarrow C$  then  $\vdash O(B/A) \leftrightarrow O(C/A)$  (CRE)

$\vdash O(T/T)$  (CN)

$\vdash (O(B/A) \wedge O(C/A)) \rightarrow O(B \wedge C/A)$   
(CAND)

# The logic CDPM.1c'

## CDPM.1c'

If  $\vdash A \leftrightarrow B$  then  $\vdash O(C/A) \leftrightarrow O(C/B)$  (RCE)

If  $\vdash B \leftrightarrow C$  then  $\vdash O(B/A) \leftrightarrow O(C/A)$  (CRE)

$\vdash O(T/T)$  (CN)

$\vdash (O(B/A) \wedge O(C/A)) \rightarrow O(B \wedge C/A)$   
(CAND)

If  $\vdash B \rightarrow C$  then  $\vdash P(B/A) \rightarrow (O(B/A) \rightarrow O(C/A))$   
(RCPM)

# The logic CDPM.1c'

## CDPM.1c'

If  $\vdash A \leftrightarrow B$  then  $\vdash O(C/A) \leftrightarrow O(C/B)$  (RCE)

If  $\vdash B \leftrightarrow C$  then  $\vdash O(B/A) \leftrightarrow O(C/A)$  (CRE)

$\vdash O(T/T)$  (CN)

$\vdash (O(B/A) \wedge O(C/A)) \rightarrow O(B \wedge C/A)$   
(CAND)

If  $\vdash B \rightarrow C$  then  $\vdash P(B/A) \rightarrow (O(B/A) \rightarrow O(C/A))$   
(RCPM)

$\vdash O(B/A) \rightarrow O(A/A)$  (QR)

$\vdash O(C/A \wedge B) \rightarrow O(B \rightarrow C/A)$  (S)

$\vdash (O(B/A) \wedge P(B \wedge C/A) \wedge \neg P(\neg B \wedge A/C)) \rightarrow O(B/A \wedge C)$   
(WRM')

# CDPM.1c' is non-explosive

None of Goble's "deontic explosion principles" is valid in **CDPM.1c'**:

DEX-1

$$\text{If } \not\vdash B \text{ then } \vdash (\mathcal{O}(A/C) \wedge \mathcal{O}(\neg A/C)) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}(B/C)$$

DEX-2

$$\vdash (\mathcal{O}(A/C) \wedge \mathcal{O}(\neg A/C)) \rightarrow (\mathcal{P}(B/C) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}(B/C))$$

DEX-3

$$\vdash (\mathcal{O}(D/C) \wedge \mathcal{P}(D/C)) \rightarrow \\ ((\mathcal{O}(A/C) \wedge \mathcal{O}(\neg A/C)) \rightarrow (\mathcal{P}(B/C) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}(B/C)))$$

# Writing conventions

## Actual obligations

OA

## Note

- $O(A/B)$  is the defeasible commitment to do  $B$  under condition  $A$
- “You are normally obliged to bring about  $A$  under condition  $B$ ”
- $OA \neq O(A/T)$

# Detachment Types

## Factual Detachment

$$\frac{A, O(B/A)}{OB}$$

## Deontic Detachment - Version a

$$\frac{OA, O(B/A)}{OB}$$

## Deontic Detachment - Version b

$$\frac{O(A/T), O(B/A)}{O(B/T)}$$

# Deontic Detachment – Version b

Deontic Detachment - Version b

$$\frac{O(A/T), O(B/A)}{O(B/T)}$$

In **CDPM.1c'** we have

$$\frac{O(A/T), P(A/T), O(B/A)}{O(B/T)}$$



# Conditional logics and Detachment – a dilemma

“We seem to feel that detachment should be possible after all. But we cannot have things both ways, can we? This is the dilemma on commitment and detachment.” (Lennart Åqvist in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Gabbay, D. and Guenther, F., 1984, p. 658)

# A problem with Detachment – Conflicting Detachment Instances

- In general we're obliged not to eat with fingers,  $\neg O(\neg f/\top)$ .
- Being served asparagus we're obliged to eat with fingers,  $\neg O(f/a)$ .
- We're being served asparagus,  $\neg a$ .

# A problem with Detachment – Conflicting Detachment Instances

- In general we're obliged not to eat with fingers,  $\neg O(\neg f/\top)$ .
- Being served asparagus we're obliged to eat with fingers,  $\neg O(f/a)$ .
- We're being served asparagus,  $\neg a$ .

There are the following possible (FD) instances:

$$\frac{a, O(f/a)}{Of}$$

$$\frac{\top, O(\neg f/\top)}{O\neg f}$$

# A problem with Detachment – Conflicting Detachment Instances

- In general we're obliged not to eat with fingers,  $\neg O(\neg f/\top)$ .
- Being served asparagus we're obliged to eat with fingers,  $\neg O(f/a)$ .
- We're being served asparagus,  $\neg a$ .

There are the following possible (FD) instances:

$$\frac{a, O(f/a)}{Of}$$

↑  
more specific  
✓

$$\frac{\top, O(\neg f/\top)}{O\neg f}$$

↑  
less specific  
✗

## How to deal with such cases?

- In general we're obliged to not eat with fingers,  $\neg O(\neg f/\top)$ .
- Being served asparagus we're obliged to eat with fingers,  $\neg O(f/a)$ .
- We're being served asparagus,  $\neg a$ .



- But,  $O(\neg f/\top)$  is *overridden*, as we also have  $O(f/a)$  and  $a$ .

## How to deal with such cases?

- In general we're obliged to not eat with fingers,  $\neg O(\neg f/\top)$ .
- Being served asparagus we're obliged to eat with fingers,  $\neg O(f/a)$ .
- We're being served asparagus,  $\neg a$ .



- But,  $O(\neg f/\top)$  is *overridden*, as we also have  $O(f/a)$  and  $a$ .
- It is not available for actualizing.

## How to deal with such cases?

- In general we're obliged to not eat with fingers,  $\neg O(\neg f/\top)$ .
- Being served asparagus we're obliged to eat with fingers,  $\neg O(f/a)$ .
- We're being served asparagus,  $\neg a$ .



- But,  $O(\neg f/\top)$  is *overridden*, as we also have  $O(f/a)$  and  $a$ .
- It is not available for actualizing.
- We model this by a weak paraconsistent negation  $\sim$ :
  - $\sim O(\neg f/\top)$  —  $O(\neg f/\top)$  is not available for actualizing.
  - $O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)$  —  $O(\neg f/\top)$  has been overridden.
- $\sim$  is characterized by:  $A \vee \sim A$

# Modelling Detachment

## Detachment for obligations

$$\boxed{\frac{B \quad O(A/B) \quad \neg \sim O(A/B)}{OA}} \quad (\text{DO})$$

- commitment to do  $A$  under condition  $B$
- $B$  is the case
- **!** the commitment is not overridden



# Modelling Detachment

## Detachment for obligations

$$\frac{B \quad O(A/B) \quad \neg \sim O(A/B)}{OA} \quad (\text{DO})$$

- commitment to do  $A$  under condition  $B$
- $B$  is the case
- **!** the commitment is not overridden

# Modelling Detachment

## Detachment for obligations

$$\boxed{\frac{B \quad O(A/B) \quad \neg \sim O(A/B)}{OA}} \quad (\text{DO})$$

- commitment to do  $A$  under condition  $B$
- $B$  is the case
- **!** the commitment is not overridden

# Modelling Detachment

## Detachment for obligations

$$\frac{B \quad O(A/B) \quad \neg \sim O(A/B)}{OA} \quad (\text{DO})$$

- commitment to do  $A$  under condition  $B$
- $B$  is the case
- **!** the commitment is not overridden

# Modelling Detachment

## Detachment for obligations

$$\frac{B \quad O(A/B) \quad \neg \sim O(A/B)}{OA} \quad (\text{DO})$$

- commitment to do  $A$  under condition  $B$
- $B$  is the case
- **!** the commitment is not overridden

## Detachment for permissions

$$\frac{B \quad P(A/B) \quad \neg \sim P(A/B)}{PA} \quad (\text{DP})$$

# Overriding obligations

## Overriding obligations

$$\frac{B \quad P(D/B) \quad O(C/A) \quad B \vdash A, \quad D \vdash \neg C}{\sim O(C/A)}$$

(RO)

# Overriding obligations

## Overriding obligations

$$\frac{B \quad P(D/B) \quad O(C/A) \quad B \vdash A, \quad D \vdash \neg C}{\sim O(C/A)} \quad (\text{RO})$$

## Example

- We're in general obliged not to eat with fingers,  $\sim O(\neg f/T)$ .
- Being served asparagus we're allowed to eat with fingers,  $\sim P(f/a)$ .
- We're being served asparagus,  $\sim a$ .

All conditions are met, hence:  $\sim O(\neg f/T)$

# Overriding permissions

Overriding permissions — analogous

$$\frac{B \quad O(D/B) \quad P(C/A) \quad B \vdash A, \quad D \vdash \neg C}{\sim P(C/A)}$$

(RO)

# Putting our framework into action

## The asparagus example

- 1  $O(\neg f/\top)$  PREM
- 2  $O(f/a)$  PREM
- 3  $P(f/a)$  PREM
- 4  $a$  PREM
- 5  $\sim O(\neg f/\top)$  1, 3, 4; *RO*



# Putting our framework into action

## The asparagus example

1	$O(\neg f/\top)$	PREM
2	$O(f/a)$	PREM
3	$P(f/a)$	PREM
4	$a$	PREM
5	$\sim O(\neg f/\top)$	1, 3, 4; <i>RO</i>

- But:  $\frac{a, O(f/a), \neg \sim O(f/a)}{Of}$  (OD)
- Hence: we would need to derive  $\neg \sim O(f/a)$

# Putting our framework into action

## The asparagus example

1	$O(\neg f/\top)$	PREM
2	$O(f/a)$	PREM
3	$P(f/a)$	PREM
4	$a$	PREM
5	$\sim O(\neg f/\top)$	1, 3, 4; <i>RO</i>

- But:  $\frac{a, O(f/a), \neg \sim O(f/a)}{Of}$  (OD)
- Hence: we would need to derive  $\neg \sim O(f/a)$

## Idea

- Apply  $\frac{B, O(A/B)}{OA}$  (FD) as much as possible
- apply it on the condition that  $\sim O(A/B)$  is not derivable

# Putting our framework into action

## The asparagus example

1	$O(\neg f/\top)$	PREM
2	$O(f/a)$	PREM
3	$P(f/a)$	PREM
4	$a$	PREM
5	$\sim O(\neg f/\top)$	1, 3, 4; <i>RO</i>

- But:  $\frac{a, O(f/a), \neg \sim O(f/a)}{Of}$  (OD)
- Hence: we would need to derive  $\neg \sim O(f/a)$

## Idea

- Apply  $\frac{B, O(A/B)}{OA}$  (FD) as much as possible
- apply it on the condition that  $\sim O(A/B)$  is not derivable
- that's where the adaptive logic comes in

# Detachment and Deontic Conflicts

Consider the following situation:  $O(a/b)$ ,  $O(\neg a/b)$  and  $b$

? What obligation should be considered as being overridden?

# Detachment and Deontic Conflicts

Consider the following situation:  $O(a/b)$ ,  $O(\neg a/b)$  and  $b$

? What obligation should be considered as being overridden?

$$\frac{B, P(\neg C/B), B \vdash A}{\sim O(C/A)}$$

(RO)

- This way nothing is overridden.
- $\rightsquigarrow OA \wedge O\neg A$

# Detachment and Deontic Conflicts

Consider the following situation:  $O(a/b)$ ,  $O(\neg a/b)$  and  $b$

? What obligation should be considered as being overridden?

$$\frac{B, P(\neg C/B), B \vdash A}{\sim O(C/A)}$$

(RO)

- This way nothing is overridden.
- $\rightsquigarrow OA \wedge O\neg A$

$$\frac{B, O(\neg C/B), B \vdash A}{\sim O(C/A)}$$

(ROO)

- Valid in logics with (D),  $O(A/B) \vdash P(A/B)$
- $\rightsquigarrow \sim O(a/b) \wedge \sim O(\neg a/b)$
- $\rightsquigarrow$  no actual obligations

# Detachment and Deontic Conflicts

Consider the following situation:  $O(a/b)$ ,  $O(\neg a/b)$  and  $b$

? What obligation should be considered as being overridden?

$$\frac{B, P(\neg C/B), B \vdash A}{\sim O(C/A)}$$

(RO)

- This way nothing is overridden.
- $\rightsquigarrow OA \wedge O\neg A$

$$\frac{B, O(\neg C/B), B \vdash A}{\sim O(C/A)}$$

(ROO)

- Valid in logics with (D),  $O(A/B) \vdash P(A/B)$
- $\rightsquigarrow \sim O(a/b) \wedge \sim O(\neg a/b)$
- $\rightsquigarrow$  no actual obligations

$$\frac{O(B/A), O(\neg B/A), A}{\sim O(B/A) \vee \sim O(\neg B/A)}$$

(ROV)

- $\rightsquigarrow \sim O(a/b) \vee \sim O(\neg a/b)$
- $\rightsquigarrow Oa \vee O\neg a$

# Adaptive Logics

## Basic Motivation

- Apply certain rules *as much as possible*,
- ... *as much as the premises allow for*



# Adaptive Logics

## Basic Motivation

- Apply certain rules *as much as possible*,
- ... *as much as the premises allow for*

## Triple Definition

- lower limit logic
- abnormalities  $\Omega$
- strategy (minimal abnormality/reliability)

# Adaptive Logics

## Basic Motivation

- Apply certain rules *as much as possible*,
- ... *as much as the premises allow for*

## Triple Definition

- lower limit logic
- abnormalities  $\Omega$
- strategy (minimal abnormality/reliability)

## Conditional application of rules

If  $A \vdash_{\text{LLL}} B \vee \bigvee_I C_i$ , then

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 I_1 & A \\
 I_2 & B
 \end{array}
 \quad
 \begin{array}{ll}
 \gamma_1 & \\
 I_1; \text{RC} & \gamma_1 \cup \{C_i : i \in I\}
 \end{array}$$

# An adaptive logic for detachment

## CDPM.1d<sup>m</sup>

- **LLL**: **CDPM.1d**, i.e. **CDPM.1c'** extended by the rules for overriding and detachment
- abnormalities:

$$\Omega = \{O(A/B) \wedge \sim O(A/B) \mid A, B \text{ are propositional formulas}\} \cup \{P(A/B) \wedge \sim P(A/B) \mid A, B \text{ are propositional formulas}\}$$

- overridden obligations and permissions
- strategy: minimal abnormality

# An adaptive logic for detachment

## CDPM.1d<sup>m</sup>

- **LLL**: **CDPM.1d**, i.e. **CDPM.1c'** extended by the rules for overriding and detachment
- abnormalities:

$$\Omega = \{O(A/B) \wedge \sim O(A/B) \mid A, B \text{ are propositional formulas}\} \cup \\ \{P(A/B) \wedge \sim P(A/B) \mid A, B \text{ are propositional formulas}\}$$

- overridden obligations and permissions
- strategy: minimal abnormality

## Applying detachment conditionally

- in **LLL**:  $B \wedge O(A/B) \vdash_{\text{LLL}} OA \vee (O(A/B) \wedge \sim O(A/B))$
- hence we derive in the adaptive logic  $OA$  from  $B \wedge O(A/B)$  on the condition  $O(A/B) \wedge \sim O(A/B)$

## Example

Minimal abnormality – in semantic terms

choose the **LLL**-models  $M$  of a given premise set  $\Gamma$  such that

there is no **LLL**-model  $N$  of  $\Gamma$  such that  $\text{Ab}(N) \subset \text{Ab}(M)$

# Example

Minimal abnormality – in semantic terms

choose the **LLL**-models  $M$  of a given premise set  $\Gamma$  such that

there is no **LLL**-model  $N$  of  $\Gamma$  such that  $\text{Ab}(N) \subset \text{Ab}(M)$

Abbreviate  $O(A/B) \wedge \sim O(A/B)$  by  $!O(A/B)$

1	$O(a/b)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(\neg a/b)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
3	$b$	PREM	$\emptyset$

# Example

Minimal abnormality – in semantic terms

choose the **LLL**-models  $M$  of a given premise set  $\Gamma$  such that

there is no **LLL**-model  $N$  of  $\Gamma$  such that  $\text{Ab}(N) \subset \text{Ab}(M)$

Abbreviate  $O(A/B) \wedge \sim O(A/B)$  by  $!O(A/B)$

1	$O(a/b)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(\neg a/b)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
3	$b$	PREM	$\emptyset$
4	$Oa$	1, 3; DO	$\{!O(a/b)\}$

# Example

## Minimal abnormality – in semantic terms

choose the **LLL**-models  $M$  of a given premise set  $\Gamma$  such that

there is no **LLL**-model  $N$  of  $\Gamma$  such that  $\text{Ab}(N) \subset \text{Ab}(M)$

Abbreviate  $O(A/B) \wedge \sim O(A/B)$  by  $!O(A/B)$

1	$O(a/b)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(\neg a/b)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
3	$b$	PREM	$\emptyset$
4	$Oa$	1, 3; <i>DO</i>	$\{!O(a/b)\}$
5	$O\neg a$	2, 3; <i>DO</i>	$\{!O(\neg a/b)\}$



# Example

## Minimal abnormality – in semantic terms

choose the **LLL**-models  $M$  of a given premise set  $\Gamma$  such that

there is no **LLL**-model  $N$  of  $\Gamma$  such that  $\text{Ab}(N) \subset \text{Ab}(M)$

Abbreviate  $O(A/B) \wedge \sim O(A/B)$  by  $!O(A/B)$

1	$O(a/b)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(\neg a/b)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
3	$b$	PREM	$\emptyset$
4	$Oa$	1, 3; <i>DO</i>	$\{!O(a/b)\}$
5	$O\neg a$	2, 3; <i>DO</i>	$\{!O(\neg a/b)\}$
6	$Oa \vee O\neg a$	4; <i>CL</i>	$\{!O(a/b)\}$
7	$Oa \vee O\neg a$	5; <i>CL</i>	$\{!O(\neg a/b)\}$

# Example

## Minimal abnormality – in semantic terms

choose the **LLL**-models  $M$  of a given premise set  $\Gamma$  such that

there is no **LLL**-model  $N$  of  $\Gamma$  such that  $\text{Ab}(N) \subset \text{Ab}(M)$

Abbreviate  $O(A/B) \wedge \sim O(A/B)$  by  $!O(A/B)$

1	$O(a/b)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(\neg a/b)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
3	$b$	PREM	$\emptyset$
<sup>8</sup> 4	$Oa$	1, 3; <i>DO</i>	$\{!O(a/b)\}$
<sup>8</sup> 5	$O\neg a$	2, 3; <i>DO</i>	$\{!O(\neg a/b)\}$
6	$Oa \vee O\neg a$	4; <i>CL</i>	$\{!O(a/b)\}$
7	$Oa \vee O\neg a$	5; <i>CL</i>	$\{!O(\neg a/b)\}$
8	$!O(a/b) \vee !O(\neg a/b)$	1, 2, 3; <i>CL</i>	$\emptyset$

## Further examples

1	$O(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
3	$O\neg f$	1; RC	$\{O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)\}$

## Further examples

1	$O(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
3	$O\neg f$	1; RC	$\{O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)\}$
4	$P(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
5	$P(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
6	$P\neg f$	4; RC	$\{P(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim P(\neg f/\top)\}$

## Further examples

1	$O(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
3	$O\neg f$	1; RC	$\{O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)\}$
4	$P(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
5	$P(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
6	$P\neg f$	4; RC	$\{P(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim P(\neg f/\top)\}$
7	$a$	PREM	$\emptyset$

## Further examples

1	$O(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
3	$O\neg f$	1; RC	$\{O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)\}$
4	$P(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
5	$P(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
6	$P\neg f$	4; RC	$\{P(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim P(\neg f/\top)\}$
7	$a$	PREM	$\emptyset$
8	$\sim O(\neg f/\top)$	1, 5, 7; RO	$\emptyset$

## Further examples

1	$O(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
9	$O\neg f$	1; RC	$\{O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)\}$
4	$P(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
5	$P(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
6	$P\neg f$	4; RC	$\{P(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim P(\neg f/\top)\}$
7	$a$	PREM	$\emptyset$
8	$\sim O(\neg f/\top)$	1, 5, 7; RO	$\emptyset$
9	$O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)$	1, 8; CL	$\emptyset$

## Further examples

1	$O(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
<sup>9</sup> 3	$O\neg f$	1; RC	$\{O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)\}$
4	$P(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
5	$P(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
6	$P\neg f$	4; RC	$\{P(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim P(\neg f/\top)\}$
7	$a$	PREM	$\emptyset$
8	$\sim O(\neg f/\top)$	1, 5, 7; RO	$\emptyset$
9	$O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)$	1, 8; CL	$\emptyset$
10	$O f$	2, 7; DO	$\{O(f/a) \wedge \sim O(f/a)\}$



## Further examples

1	$O(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
2	$O(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
<sup>9</sup> 3	$O\neg f$	1; RC	$\{O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)\}$
4	$P(\neg f/\top)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
5	$P(f/a)$	PREM	$\emptyset$
<sup>12</sup> 6	$P\neg f$	4; RC	$\{P(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim P(\neg f/\top)\}$
7	$a$	PREM	$\emptyset$
8	$\sim O(\neg f/\top)$	1, 5, 7; RO	$\emptyset$
9	$O(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim O(\neg f/\top)$	1, 8; CL	$\emptyset$
10	$O f$	2, 7; DO	$\{O(f/a) \wedge \sim O(f/a)\}$
11	$\sim P(\neg f/\top)$	4, 2, 7; RP	$\emptyset$
<sup>12</sup> 12	$P(\neg f/\top) \wedge \sim P(\neg f/\top)$	4, 11; CL	$\emptyset$

# Outlook

An adaptive deontic logic has been presented, that ...

- is conditional,
- can deal with deontic conflicts,
- allows for detachment

# Outlook

An adaptive deontic logic has been presented, that ...

- is conditional,
- can deal with deontic conflicts,
- allows for detachment

## Further Remarks

- there is an adaptive improvement of **CDPM.1c** that can be combined with the adaptive logic for detachment
- the way of modelling adaptively detachment via a paraconsistent negation can be generalized for other conditional deontic logics